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The term ‘pluralism’ features prominently in many accounts of deliberative 
democracy. Usually, it is taken to describe the fact that people hold different values 
and beliefs and hence arrive at different conclusions about how we ought to live. 
Accordingly, a central question in the theory of deliberative democracy is how we 
should respond to the fact that people not only differ but also disagree. As one might 
expect, deliberative democrats have offered a range of different answers to this 
fundamental question. We begin this chapter by discussing one such answer. As John 
Rawls argues, in seeking to resolve disagreements about the basic structure of a 
democratic society, the members of that society should appeal not to their own beliefs 
and values but to the sorts of political value that one might naturally expect to find 
inherent in the public political culture of any democratic society—equality, freedom, 
fairness, toleration, the rule of law etc. (Rawls 1996, 1997). As such, Rawls does not 
try to deal with the fact of pluralism directly through democratic deliberation. Rather, 
he seeks to deal with it by excluding it from the political domain. For Rawls, 
deliberation need not go all the way down. 
While Rawls thinks that we should respond to the fact of pluralism by 
requiring people to couch their political arguments in terms of general political values, 
critics argue that his approach is too restrictive. In their view, Rawls is insufficiently 
sensitive to the fact that some people—for example, those with little formal education 
or the members of some minority ethnic, linguistic or religious groups—may struggle 
to express themselves in such terms (Sanders 1997; Young 2000). Rather than 
privileging any one mode of political argument, the critics think that the theory of 
deliberative democracy should incorporate a plurality of modes of political 
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communication, including story-telling and singing. Our sense is that many 
deliberative democrats think that the critics are broadly right (e.g., Bächtiger et al. 
2010). Yet the claim that some people may struggle to couch their arguments in terms 
of general political values is an empirical claim that has yet to be properly tested.  
In the second section of this chapter, we offer a quantitative analysis of data on 
ethnic relations in Britain retrieved from two quality British broadsheets, The 
Guardian and The Times, during the course of 2007.1 Following Koopmans and 
Statham (1999), the coding scheme that we employ allows us to analyse the claims 
actors make in terms of their ‘linguistic grammar’ (for a more detailed discussion, see 
Cinalli and O’Flynn 2013). Among other attributes, we check to see whether a given 
claim includes a general political value and, if so, which one. While ethnic groups are 
precisely the sorts of actor that one might expect to struggle on this measure, our data 
suggest that the case against Rawls’s approach is far from decisive.  
‘Pluralism’ can also be used to refer to ‘value pluralism’, which is a (meta-
ethical) theory about the nature of value itself. According to this theory, values are 
irreducibly plural and, in significant measure, uncombinable and incommensurable.2 
Value pluralists therefore stand opposed to the view that conflicts between values can 
be resolved by tracing those values back to an underlying master value such as utility 
or by ranking them hierarchically along a single scale. Value pluralists are not 
relativists. On the contrary, they insist that there is a world of objective values (Berlin 
1991: 11). However, they also insist that there is no ‘perfect whole’ or ‘ultimate 
solution’ in which all the different values might be reconciled (Berlin 1991: 13). 
It is surprising that deliberative democrats have not spent more time 
considering the challenge that value pluralism poses to deliberative democracy. As we 
explain in the third section of this chapter, the truth of value pluralism would render 
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deliberative democracy redundant in the face of value conflict. If values (democratic 
or otherwise) cannot be rationally compared, we might bargain or vote, or perhaps just 
resort to power. But what we cannot do is seek to convince or persuade others that our 
preferred values are superior to theirs.  
Rather than persisting with deliberative democracy, some radical democrats 
think we should instead seek to cultivate a political sensibility that is capable of 
transforming ‘antagonism’ into ‘agonism’ (Connolly 2005; Mouffe 2002). Yet as we 
argue in the fourth section, before rushing to embrace radical proposals of this sort, 
we should first check whether the empirical evidence actually supports the truth of 
value pluralism. Once again, we draw on data from our research into ethnic relations 
in Britain. Yet this time, instead of merely coding values, we draw on network 
analysis to see how different values and actors relate to one another.3 As we suggest, 
the variable relational patterns that emerge allow us to test the combinability and 
commensurability of different values, and hence to assess the extent to which the 
empirical evidence confirms or disconfirms the truth of value pluralism.  
 
 The fact of pluralism 
 
According to Rawls, the fact that people hold different beliefs and values is not 
merely a contingent and unfortunate fact about the world. Rather, it is a natural 
consequence of our use of reason in circumstances of freedom, particularly given the 
burdens of judgement (the burdens of reasoning under conditions of incomplete 
information, moral uncertainty and so forth). Yet since reasonable people will 
recognise that everyone is subject to the same burdens of judgement, Rawls thinks it 
4 
 
is important to distinguish the mere fact of pluralism from the fact of reasonable 
pluralism (Rawls 1996: 37, 54-56, 61 and passim).  
Two points should be noted here. First, the distinction between the mere fact 
of pluralism and the fact of reasonable pluralism enables us to see why Rawls is not a 
value pluralist—or, perhaps more accurately, to see why value pluralism does not 
figure in his account. For Rawls, value pluralism is (what he terms) a ‘comprehensive 
doctrine’. That is, it is precisely the sort of ethical doctrine about which people can 
reasonably disagree and it cannot therefore provide a foundation for a just and stable 
democratic society. Admittedly, some commentators have not read Rawls in this way. 
For example, George Crowder argues that Rawls’s acknowledgement of the burdens 
of judgement amounts to a commitment to value pluralism (Crowder 2002: 165-172; 
but see Jones 2006: 197-198). Yet Rawls himself did not think so—and we think he is 
right not to think so, since there is no logical link between the two. Rawls seeks to 
explain why people disagree and does not root his explanation in any theory about the 
nature of value. Nor need he do so, since the burdens of judgement idea is 
independent of the truth or otherwise of value pluralism (see Jones 2006: 197-198).4 
Secondly, the reasonableness for which Rawls argues is not part of some 
larger epistemological theory; although it has epistemological elements, it is not about 
defining the content of reasonableness per se. Rather, it is part of a broader normative 
understanding of what the political equality of democracy demands (Rawls 1996: 49-
50, 62). On that understanding, recognising others as equals in political argument 
means recognising that those others can have reasons to hold their views as firmly as 
we hold ours. Accordingly, if we do not make a serious effort to deliberate with them 
and try to find reasons that they can freely accept, we fail to treat them as political 
equals. This does not mean that we have to become milk-and-watery in the way in 
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which we hold our views; Rawls never intended his argument for deliberative 
democracy to be interpreted in that way (Rawls 1996: 62-63; Jones 2003: 104-106). 
But it does mean that, when it comes to deciding important matters of law and policy, 
we should not simply insist on the truth of our own values and beliefs (although we 
may well believe them to be true). 
Thus, on this view, arguments that people would be able to accept only if they 
were to become the adherents of some particular religious doctrine have no place in 
democratic deliberation—they have no place because they will not be generally 
accessible and acceptable (Rawls 1996: 62; Barry 2006: 23-24). When we make no 
effort to couch our arguments in terms that other people could in principle accept, or 
to develop our own views in ways that makes them responsive to theirs, we do not 
treat those with whom we disagree as equal partners in a common democratic 
enterprise—at best we treat them as an obstacle to be overcome (Dworkin 2006b: 
132-133). 
To understand why Rawls thinks that the members of a democratic society 
should couch their political arguments in terms of general political values, one 
therefore needs to understand the account of political equality with which it is bound 
up (Rawls 1996: 100-101; 1997:770). (For further discussion of the relationship 
between deliberative democracy and equality see Chapter 2 ‘Inequality and 
Democracy’ by Peter McLaverty.) On that account, democratic deliberation should 
proceed from common ground, and Rawls thinks that that ground can be found in 
democratic values. For example, different religious groups might be able to share the 
same principle of fairness, even though each conceives of that principle as grounded 
in its own faith (Rawls 1996: 147).5  
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Of course, the fact that people share the same political value does not mean 
that political agreement will inevitably follow. Rawls accepts this much (Rawls 1996: 
240). In particular, he accepts that a point may be reached when political values no 
longer help and we can no longer keep comprehensive doctrines out of political 
decision-making (Rawls 1996: 247-254; cf. Rawls 1997: 797-799). Yet while some 
matters will have to be resolved through the ordinary democratic process (i.e., through 
bargaining or log-rolling or voting), he nevertheless thinks that political values can 
have a vital role to play, particularly in decisions about the basic structure of society, 
including, for example, constitutional matters, family law or economic regulation. 
Still, as we pointed out in our introductory remarks, Rawls’s approach has 
come in for considerable criticism. One criticism that comes up repeatedly in the 
broader deliberative democracy literature is that, in seeking to constrain what people 
can and cannot say, Rawls’s approach is insufficiently sensitive to the very fact of 
(reasonable) pluralism to which it is meant to respond. We offer an empirical 
assessment of that criticism in the next section.  
 
Who appeals to general political values? 
 
Rawls’s approach is exclusive rather than inclusive. It does not try to deal with the 
fact of pluralism directly through democratic deliberation but instead leaves that fact 
in place and provides political arrangements that are independent of it. Those who 
criticise Rawls for ‘taking the politics out of politics’ are therefore broadly right: for 
the most party, he seeks to deal with the fact of pluralism constitutionally rather than 
democratically (e.g., Habermas 1998: 58). Yet the reason why he insists that people 
couch their arguments in terms of general political values is to ensure that political 
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power is not used to impose, promote, impede, or disadvantage any part of reasonable 
pluralism (Rawls 1996: 217, 243). In other words, the point is to ensure that 
democratic deliberation will be fair, or proceed on fair terms, given the fact of 
pluralism.  
Against this approach, critics such as Lynn Sanders and Iris Marion Young 
argue that what Rawls fails to see is that, through no fault of their own, some people 
may struggle to couch their arguments in terms of general political values (Sanders 
1997: 352-353, 361; Young 2000: 56). For example, those with little formal education 
or those belonging to a new immigrant group may simply lack the requisite 
vocabulary; in the case of some linguistic minorities, the point here may be doubly 
true. As a result, their views may be excluded from serious consideration, not 
necessarily because of what they say but because of how they say it. 
Neither Sanders nor Young is hostile to deliberative democracy per se. But 
each thinks that it needs to be expanded or enlarged so as to take alternative forms of 
political expression into account (see also Bohman 1995). Young, for example, argues 
that narrative or story-telling should be included since it can provide crucial insights 
into people’s fears and aspirations, the motivations they attribute to others, and their 
willingness to act in some ways but not in others. Indeed, she claims that narrative ‘is 
often the only vehicle for understanding the particular experiences of those in 
particular social situations, experiences not shared by those situated differently, but 
which they must understand in order to do justice’ (Young 2000: 73-74). 
Recently, a number of scholars have suggested that the sort of ‘type I’ 
approach that Rawls advocates and the sort of ‘type II’ approach that Sanders and 
Young advocate ‘might be integrated in such a way as to complement each other’ 
(Bachtiger et al. 2010: 34). In fact, Rawls allows that, on the ‘wide view of public 
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reason’, people may appeal to their own beliefs and values, but only on the condition 
that, in due course, political values are presented to support their case (Rawls 1996: li-
ii; 1997: 783-787). Narratives can enable groups to present a unified front, which may 
help them to get their views and concerns across to the wider public. But decisions 
about the basic structure of society cannot simply be based on narratives, not least of 
all because different narratives can conflict. When they do conflict, we must seek to 
deliberate from common ground or risk one group imposing its way of life on others 
(see Dryzek 2000: 68-69).  
Nevertheless, while there are good reasons for privileging general political 
values, one might still worry that some people will struggle to couch their arguments 
in such terms. However, as we pointed out in our introductory remarks, the issue here 
is ultimately an empirical one: does who we are make a difference to our ability to 
deliberate in the way that Rawls suggests? 
Table 1 below is based on our analysis of claims or (what we term) 
‘deliberative interventions’ made in the field of ethnic relations in Britain, as reported 
in the pages of the The Guardian and the The Times. Formally, we define a 
deliberative intervention as a verbal statement made by an actor in the public sphere 
that rests upon a variable articulation of an argument in relation to the argument of 
another actor. More prosaically, an intervention usually takes the form of a direct 
quote and usually supports or opposes the views of some other actor. For example, 
defending his view that Imams should be trained at British universities to help 
Muslims integrate into mainstream society, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, argued 
that ‘The voices of extremism are no more representative of Islam than the use in 
times gone by of torture to force conversion to Christianity represented the teachings 
of Christ’. In response, Mazin Younis, a volunteer Imam at Leeds University, argued 
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that ‘Extremism is not created from abroad, it is coming from within. Blair’s plans 
could have the opposite effect.’6 The coding of support and opposition allows us to 
map relations between actors and between actors and the values to which they appeal 
(which is central to the relational analysis that we present later).  
Data are aggregated according to a number of broad categories of actor: for 
example, ‘institutional actors’ includes government, parliament and the judiciary, 
‘intermediate actors’ includes political parties, trade unions and the media, ‘minority 
actors’ includes ethnic as well as various religious minorities such as Muslims, Jews 
and Sikhs, and ‘civil society’ includes NGO movements and general professional 
organisations. Data are also aggregated according to a number of broad categories of 
value: thus, ‘civil and political liberties’ includes human rights, freedom of religion 
and the good of democracy itself, ‘justice’ includes the right to a fair trial, fairness and 
equal treatment, ‘safety, security and prosperity’ includes peace, personal well-being 
and economic growth, ‘respect for difference’ includes empathy and mutual 
understanding, and ‘social cohesion’ includes inclusion, toleration and community.  
 
Table 1 Actors and Values 
 Institutional 
actors % 
Intermediate 
actors % 
Minority 
actors % 
Civil 
society 
actors % 
All actors % 
No value 12.6 (33) 14.7 (10) 10.0 (11) 9.0 (16) 11.3 (70)  
Civil and 
political 
liberties 
13.0 (34) 10.3 (7) 15.5 (17) 12.4 (22) 12.9 (80)  
Justice 15.6 (41) 13.2 (9) 13.6 (15) 17.4 (31) 15.5 (96)  
Safety, 
security and 
prosperity 
17.9 (47) 7.4 (5) 7.3 (8) 6.7 (12) 11.7 (72)  
Respect for 
difference 
19.5 (51) 23.5 (16) 20.9 (23) 29.2 (52) 23.0 (142)  
Social 
cohesion 
10.3 (27) 10.3 (7) 10.0 (11) 7.3 (13) 9.4 (58)  
Other 
values 
11.1 (29) 20.6 (14) 22.7 (25) 18.0 (32) 16.2 (100)  
Total 100.0 (262) 100.0 (68) 100.0 (110) 100.0 (178) 100.0 (618) 
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N between parentheses 
Cramer’s V = ns 
 
The first point to note is that this is not a ‘top-down’ elitist field in which institutional 
actors account for the vast majority of interventions. ‘Bottom-up’ intervention is 
strong and, in particular, minority actors are highly visible. The overall figure of 110 
interventions for minorities goes well beyond that of 68 for intermediate actors. And 
when minorities are taken together with civil society, their visibility is actually higher 
than that of institutional actors. The second point to note is that minorities do not 
seem to have any difficulty appealing to the same values as everybody else. A quick 
glance at the data is sufficient to show that the situation in the field of ethnic relations 
in Britain is far from fostering ‘internal exclusions of style and idiom’, as Young 
suggests.  
But what about the distribution of values across actors? The test of 
significance shows that there are no relevant differences in terms of the distribution of 
values between different categories of actor. Put simply, one can say that variations of 
value are not significantly linked to variations of actor. That said, disaggregating data 
does allow for some more specific remarks.  
Take, for example, Muslims—a minority actor whose speech is supposedly 
particular  rather than general. Our findings show that Muslims chiefly appeal to the 
value of social cohesion. But they also frequently appeal to ‘other values’, that is, to 
values that do not feature strongly in public political debate—for example, the need to 
increase moral standards, the importance of reputation and respect for animals. 
However, this latter characteristic is not all that unusual, since it is also shared with 
civil society actors.  
While we recognise the provisional nature of these findings, and hence the 
need for further research in this area (for relevant contributions, see Wessler 2008; 
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Dolezal et al. 2010), overall our data suggest that minorities do not struggle to couch 
their arguments in terms of general political values, or in terms of the sorts of value 
one might expect to find inherent in the public political culture of a modern 
democratic society. On the contrary, they seem to have relatively little trouble doing 
so.  
 
The challenge of value pluralism 
In our introductory remarks, we said that, to date, deliberative democrats have 
not had much to say about value pluralism. That may be because they have yet to see 
that value pluralism is potentially a problem or it may be because abstract theories are 
hard to translate into concrete empirical studies (if, indeed, they can sensibly be 
translated at all). But whatever the case, the truth of value pluralism would seriously 
impair the case for deliberative democracy. According to value pluralism, we can all 
agree that justice, equality, generosity, freedom, community, and so forth are 
genuinely valuable. Yet the trouble is that there is no uniquely right way of putting 
them together or of ranking them on a single scale (but see Dworkin 2006a). We are 
always having to make trade-offs and sacrifices and people make these in different 
ways. 
If there is no uniquely right way of putting values together, there is little point 
in thinking that deliberative democracy might serve as a solution to value conflict. I 
might be able to appreciate your values and you might be able to appreciate mine. But 
should our values conflict, and should they also turn out to be uncombinable and 
incommensurable, there is no basis on which we might reason our way to a solution 
(cf. Bohman 1995: 254). Of course, not all conflicts are conflicts of value. Some are 
conflicts of interest, which might still be resolved through deliberation. But 
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unfortunately some of the most pressing problems that we face today do involve 
conflicts of value, which is why the challenge here is so great. 
Obviously, the truth of value pluralism would undermine Rawls’s approach: 
although Rawls thinks that we should couch our arguments in terms of general 
political values, those values might well be uncombinable and incommensurable. But 
the truth of value pluralism would also undermine attempts to include narrative and 
other forms of political communication: the values which different narratives seek to 
express might be subject to the same problems as the values Rawls extols. (Naturally, 
the truth of value pluralism would also undermine attempts to integrate ‘type I’ and 
‘type II’ approaches.) 
Thus, in the somewhat dystopian words of John Finnis, ‘if worldviews are 
incommensurable, we have no reason to accept a scheme of social decision making, a 
constitution, a Rule of Law. For each person, then, the challenge is simply to become 
and remain one of those who are in charge’ (Finnis 1997: 217). Rather than accept 
such a conclusion, radical democrats such as William Connolly (2005), Chantal 
Mouffe (2002) and Glen Newey (2001) advocate a less overtly rational, more 
immanent, approach to dealing with conflicts of value. There are important 
differences between each of these thinkers, but for purposes of illustration, we can 
focus on the arguments of Connolly. 
For Connolly, a ‘pluralist’ is someone who has his own beliefs and values but 
who also strives to accept, value and respect the positions of others. Thus, ‘a 
pluralistic society inculcates the virtues of relational modesty between proponents of 
different faiths and creeds, and it seeks to limit the power of those who would 
overthrow diversity in the name of religious unitarianism’ (Connolly 2005: 40-41). 
That view is similar to Rawls’s idea of the good citizen who adheres to his own 
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comprehensive doctrine but who, as a citizen, is also committed to others, with their 
different comprehensive doctrines, having the same part as himself in the political 
process. The difference is that Connolly thinks that pluralism will apply to all matters, 
including people’s notion of the just or fair society. It is, therefore, a comprehensive 
doctrine of the sort that Rawls thinks should not be used to justify important decisions 
of law and policy.  
The pluralism that Connolly adheres to is also different from ‘value pluralism’ 
as we find it in the works of, for example, Isaiah Berlin or John Gray. His pluralism is 
not simply a theory of value, but is also about recognising, embracing, valuing and 
providing for a world that is pluralist in nature. (That is, it is not just a meta-ethical 
theory but is also an ethical theory about how we ought to live.) It is not about 
overcoming conflict but about ‘transmuting’ ‘antagonism’ into ‘agonism’. In 
particular, it is about generating ‘agonistic respect’ among people who hold different 
beliefs and values (Connolly 2005: 47-48). 
Thus, Connolly not only accepts but positively celebrates (or would have us 
celebrate) the uncombinability and incommensurability of values. ‘Agonistic respect’ 
emerges not through democratic deliberation, but through the development of a 
‘relational sensibility’. That sensibility does not seek to place deliberative democracy 
‘above faith’, but instead seeks ‘to forge a positive ethos of public engagement 
between alternative faiths’ (Connolly 2005: 49, 60). Agonistic respect works from 
within rather than from without.  
Connolly advances a positive agenda—he thinks that uncombinability and 
incommesurability can be addressed through the cultivation of appropriate 
dispositions. Yet uncombinability and incommesurability are not themselves 
interrogated. By this we do not mean to suggest that they remain undefined. Rather, 
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the problem is that Connolly simply assumes that different values are frequently 
incommensurable without every really testing that assumption. 
As we have said, the truth of value pluralism would be extremely damaging 
for deliberative democracy: if value pluralism were true, conflicts of value could not 
be rationally arbitrated. But is it so?  
 
Assessing the truth of value pluralism 
  
One way in which we might proceed is to ask about value pluralism’s explanatory 
power as a theory. The theory of gravity seems to do a pretty good job of explaining 
why things fall down. But does the theory of value pluralism do a good job of 
explaining value conflict—for example, a conflict between groups belonging to 
different religious faiths? According to Berlin, we ‘are doomed to choose, and every 
choice may entail an irreparable loss’ (Berlin 1991:13). But is that really how 
religious believers see things? Do they really think of themselves simply as having 
made different trade-offs and sacrifices? As Peter Jones argues, someone who is 
genuinely committed to a particular religious faith would be unlikely to accept that 
other faiths are no less valuable than his own. But if religious faiths really are 
incommensurable, that is indeed what he should accept (Jones 2006: 194). Since that 
seems implausible, it raises questions about the truth of value pluralism. 
Rather than continue on this conceptual tack, let us instead proceed by 
considering whether the empirical evidence actually confirms or disconfirms the truth 
of value pluralism. In just a moment we will introduce our own data, but first we want 
to highlight some existing empirical research that bears on this question. 
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Evidence from deliberative polls shows that deliberation consistently brings 
political preferences closer to ‘single-peakedness’ (Farrar et al. 2010).7 Simon 
Niemeyer and John Drzyek arrive at similar conclusions based on deliberative 
experiments using Q methodology (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007). These findings are 
important because they suggest that deliberative democracy can bring people to 
understand an issue in the same way or along the same dimension. When there is 
more than one issue dimension, there is more than one social choice. But when there 
is only one issue dimension, decision making is much less arbitrary.8 
This body of evidence does not show (nor does it claim to show) that 
deliberative democracy leads people to agree, only that they see what they disagree 
about so that there is an underlying dimension for their disagreement. In other words, 
it shows that deliberative democracy enables people to arrive at a meta-agreement on 
what the issues really are and what shared dimension underlies their differences 
(Fishkin 2009: 103-104). So it seems that deliberative democracy is not powerless in 
the face of value conflict: people may disagree, but deliberative democracy can at 
least bring them to understand the choice before them in the same way—including the 
values that ought to underpin their collective choice.9 
The problem, however, is that this evidence does not refute the truth of value 
pluralism altogether. Deliberative democracy may lead people to agree that the policy 
options represent a choice between two values. For example, immigration policy, 
which might conceivably bring any number of values into play, might universally 
come to be seen as a choice between equal treatment and security. But those two 
values might still turn out to be uncombinable and incommensurable. At that point, 
deliberation might have run its course; there might be no possibility of reasoning with 
one another beyond that point (see Gray 1995b: 71). 
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We accept that this may happen, but the vital question is to what degree? In 
order to get a handle on this question, we think that a relational analysis across actors 
and values is potentially a worthwhile research strategy.10 More specifically, a 
relational analysis allows us to do two things. First, it allows us to consider how 
different values are connected through the actors that make use of them. In this way, 
we can tackle the question of combinability; the higher the number of actors that 
appeal to a given pair of values, the more those values are combinable. Secondly, it 
allows us to compare patterns of exchanges that actors forge when referring to 
different values. In this way, we can tackle the question of commensurability: the 
more that values are rooted in similar relational patterns, the more they are 
commensurable. In both cases, we again draw on our data on ethnic relations in 
Britain. 
Starting with combinability, table 2 presents a matrix of values by actors. 
Since the question we seek to answer is whether individual values are combinable, 
table 2 does not use aggregate categories of value as in table 1 but instead focuses on 
four specific political values—empathy, justice, equal opportunity and well-being—
that minorities use extensively.11 The number at the crossing of any two values 
indicates exactly how many different actors make use of the two values. The higher 
the number, the more likely it is that actors think of these values as being combinable.  
 
Table 2. Combinability: values by actors 
 Empathy Justice Equal 
opportunity 
Well-being Total 
Empathy x 10 2 15 27 
Justice 10 x 4 8 22 
Equal 
opportunity 
2 4 x 2 8 
Well-being 15 8 2 x 25 
Total 27 22 8 25  
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Scores show that values are combinable, since each possible pair is connected. 
However, some values are more combinable than others: in terms of the numbers of 
actors who appeal to them, empathy and well-being are the most combinable whereas 
empathy and equal opportunity and well-being and equal opportunity are the least 
combinable. The other three possible pairs of values are somewhere in between. 
Empathy is the most combinable overall, scoring a total of 27 links with all 
other values. By comparison, justice is less combinable than empathy, yet combines 
better with equal opportunity. Equal opportunity is the least combinable of the four, 
but is combinable nonetheless. So, while there is variation, scores do not not confirm 
the truth of value pluralism. Actors appeal to many different values and many 
different pairs of values. 
Turning to the question of incommensurability, what needs to be considered is 
the extent to which values are too different to compare. We treat the degree to which 
values perform differently to one another as a valid indicator, with ‘performance’ 
defined in terms of the relational patterns that are built upon them. Hence, we ask: do 
values display the same relational pattern or do they display different relational 
patterns? The more that relational patterns differ, the more it may be that we are 
dealing with values that cannot be ranked along a single scale. In what follows, we 
analyse relational information for the same four political values as above. However, 
since we are interested in the patterns of exchanges that actors forge when referring to 
a given value, we are more explicit about the actors involved.12 In particular, since 
much of the ethnic relations debate in Britain focuses on Muslim actors (Muslims), 
we have treated these actors separately from other ethnic minority actors.  
Figure 1 deals with the relational patterns that have been built upon the value 
of empathy. While the central position of governmental actors (Gov) is not a surprise, 
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it is interesting to note that ethnic minority actors (EM) also have a fairly central 
position in the field. Although Muslim actors do not occupy a central position, they 
are directly linked to government and hence, via government, are well networked. 
Muslims are also closely linked to Hindus (Hindus) and, perhaps less surprisingly, to 
pro-minority organisations (Pro-M). More precisely, they act as a bridge bewteen 
Hindus and government and pro-minority organisations and government. 
 
Figure 1. Empathy: relational patterns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 deals with relational patterns that have been built upon the value of 
well-being. In this case, ethnic minorities occupy a more peripheral position. While 
Muslims have forged ties with far fewer actors, they are once again closely linked to 
government and, as a consequence, enjoy an indirect link with every other actor in the 
field. In this respect, we can say that empathy and well-being perform similarly in 
relational terms. 
 
Figure 2. Well-being: relational patterns 
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Moving to the analysis of ‘justice’ in figure 3, it is noticeable how this value 
performs similarly to empathy and well-being in terms of the concrete use that ethnic 
minorities make of it. Although quite peripheral, ethnic minorities are also present in 
the form of ethnic professional organisations (Ethprof) such as the National Black 
Police Association. However, Muslims do not feature in this relational field, 
appealing too rarely to the value of justice to be included in our analysis. To this 
extent, justice performs differently in relational terms to empathy and well-being.  
 
Figure 3. Justice: relational patterns 
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Figure 4 deals with our final value, ‘equal opportunities’. Once again, Muslim 
actors have no role to play in this relation field. Yet unlike our other three values, 
ethnic professional organisations are highly central and are directly linked to three of 
the four actors of the relational field. Interestingly, this inverts the more usual 
pattern—unlike the other three values, government is peripheral rather than central 
and ethnic minorities are central rather than peripheral. Accordingly, this value 
performs very differently in relational terms to the other values we have examined. 
 
Figure 4. Equal opportunities: relational patterns 
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In sum, this evidence is fairly mixed. There is evidence of low levels of 
incommensurability—for example, the fact that government and executive agencies 
(ExAg) tend to offer a privileged axis of value discussion, the fact that Muslims are 
usually close to pro-minorities, and the consistent position of the police (Police). But 
there is also evidence of incommensurability—most obviously, equal opportunities 
seems to perform very differently, since it inverts the more usual pattern. Added to 
that, Muslims feature in only two of four relational fields, while the position of ethnic 
minorities is also variable (at times they are present in their own right and at times 
present only through the specific role of ethnic professionals). 
It is hard to know what to say at this point. Part of the difficulty here is due to 
the fact that value pluralists themselves are undecided about just how much 
incommensurability value pluralism entails. So, whereas our evidence might 
conceivably count against the more extreme position held by John Gray, it might not 
count much against the more moderate position held by Isaiah Berlin. So really a lot 
depends on where one stands on the theoretical issues. That said, deliberative 
democrats need to spend time thinking not just about the philosophical issues, but also 
about questions of measurement. We have suggested that the extent to which actors 
fail to forge similar relational patterns upon different values might serve as an 
indicator of the incommensurability of those values. Yet we are happy to admit that 
there might be better, more telling, indictors to hand. 
 
Conclusion 
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It is probably fair to say that, when deliberative democrats think about pluralism, they 
are thinking about the fact of pluralism. That fact is bound up with the question of 
how to respond to the fact that people not only differ but also disagree. We based our 
treatment of that question around a defence of Rawls’s claim that arguments about 
important decisions of law and policy should be couched in terms of general political 
values—or the sorts of value that one might expect to find inherent in the public 
political culture of a modern democratic society. While that claim has come in for 
considerable criticism, we think that many of the criticisms are misplaced. General 
political values serve to ensure that one way of life cannot simply impose its beliefs 
and preferences on other ways of life. And while many deliberative democrats worry 
that the language of political values can itself have exclusionary effects, our empirical 
evidence does not support that worry.  
The second half of this chapter considered the challenge that value pluralism 
poses to deliberative democracy. That challenge is bound up with a very different 
question: if values are uncombinable and incommensurable, is deliberative democracy 
powerless in the face of value conflict? Our evidence suggests that different values 
are, in fact, combinable, which gives the lie to value pluralism. We accept, though, 
that incommensurability is a harder nut to crack. We have tried to empirically assess 
how different values perform in terms of the different relational structures that are 
built upon them. The guiding thought here was that, insofar as values perform very 
differently, they are not comparable; they look different because they are different and 
hence it makes little sense to say that they can be ranked along a single scale. Here, 
the evidence neither confirms nor disconfirms the truth of value pluralism. What it 
does confirm, however, is the need for further research. 
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1 We accept that newspapers are always subject to problems of selection bias and 
hence to the risk of portraying a distorted deliberative reality (e.g., McQuail 1992: 
193-195). Yet the fact remains that newspaper reporting plays its part in constituting 
the world in which we live and, in effect, determining and delimiting the scope for 
deliberative democracy. In short, one ‘does not need to adhere to the fashion for 
radical constructivism and post-modernism to recognise that the mass media 
contribute to the symbolic construction of realities’ (Peters et al. 2008: 139). 
2 See e.g., Berlin 1969, 1991; Gray 1995a, 1995b, 2000; but see Dworkin 2006a; 
Jones 2006.  
3 On network analysis, see Wasserman and Faust 1994; Knoke and Kuklinsky 1982; 
Scott 2000. 
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4 In Political Liberalism (1996: 57), Rawls does make a favourable comment in 
relation to Isaiah Berlin. In particular, he accepts Berlin’s point that hard choices 
sometimes need to be made between values. Yet that does not commit him to value 
pluralism. On the contrary, he explicitly dissociates himself from that theory (1996: 
57, n. 10). As far as we know, Rawls never makes any use of, or even refers to, 
uncombinability or incommensurability. 
5 In a similar vein, Ronald Dworkin has recently argued that, despite appearances to 
the contrary, most Americans, whether ‘red’ or ‘blue’ in ideological conviction, share 
a basic commitment to the values of intrinsic equality and personal autonomy 
(Dworkin 2006b). He then goes on to show how those values can serve as common 
ground on which to deliberate about some of the most divisive issues in American 
public policy (abortion, health care etc.). 
6 In our analysis, actors deliberate (or are classed as deliberating with one another) 
only when they argue back forth over a repeated number of instances (a single 
deliberative intervention would not capture the dynamic nature of deliberation as we 
understand it). We take three such exchanges as the minimum required for there to be 
deliberation. In the example cited in the text, Blair was coded as ‘government’ and 
Younis as ‘Muslim’. 
7 ‘A combination of preferences is single-peaked across individuals if the alternatives 
can be aligned on some “structuring” dimension, say from left to right, such that every 
individual has a most preferred alternative and a decreasing preference for other 
alternatives as they get more distant in either direction from it’ (Farrar et al. 2010: 
337-338). 
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8 For an early formulation, see Miller 1992. For a more extensive study of this and 
related issues, see Mackie 2003. For a summary of the social choice critique of 
deliberative democracy, see van Mill 1996: 740-743. 
9 To date, the mechanisms by which all of this works are open to debate. How exactly 
is it that deliberation leads people in the direction of uni-dimensionality? Miller 
argues that having to deliberate in public will automatically exclude certain sorts of 
argument and preference, specifically those that appeal to or reflect purely private 
interests (Miller 1992: 61-62). Fishkin points to the effects of balanced argument and 
good information on the preferences people hold (Fishkin 2009: 34). Niemeyer and 
Dryzek stress the importance of logical consistency or what they term ‘inter-
subjective rationality’ (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007: 50). 
10 Methodologically, we draw on network analysis. See note 3 above. 
11 The thought here is that values that are notable for the fact that are used extensively 
by minority actors will be less combinable overall than values notable for the fact that 
they are extensively used by majority actors. In other words, the thought is that they 
provide a sterner test. Whether this is actually the case is in need of further testing. 
12 In figures 1-4, actors are as follows: CS = civil society organisations; EE = ethnic 
extremists; EM = ethnic minorities; ER = extreme right; Ethprof = ethnic professional 
organisations; ExAg = executive agencies; Gov = government; Hindus = Hindus; Jud 
= the judiciary; Media = media; Muslims = Muslims; Police = police; Parl = 
parliament; PP = political parties; Prof = professional bodies; Pro-M = pro-minority 
organisations.   
 
